An important phenomenon on the Internet has been the emergence of "infomediaries" or Internet referral services such as Autobytel.com and Carpoint.com in the automobile industry, Avviva.com in real estate and Healthcareadvocates.com in medicine. These services offer consumers the opportunity to get price quotes from enrolled brick-and-mortar retailers as also information on invoice prices, reviews and speciÞcations before they commence the shopping process. Internet referral services also direct consumer traffic to particular retailers who join them.
before they commence the shopping process. Internet referral services also direct consumer traffic to particular retailers who join them.
The view of industry analysts and practitioners is that these infomediaries are valuable to consumers who can use them to get better prices from retailers. What is less clear though is the manner in which these infomediaries affect the market competition between retailers. In this paper, we analyze the impact of referral infomediaries on the functioning of retail markets and the contractual arrangements that they should use in selling their services. We identify the set of market conditions under which an infomediary can exist and provide an understanding of how they would evolve with the growth of the Internet.
The model that we develop captures the key economic characteristics that deÞne an Internet referral infomediary. On the consumer side, a referral infomediary helps consumers to costlessly get an additional retail price quote before purchase. On the Þrm side, a referral infomediary endows an enrolled retailer with the ability to price discriminate between consumers who come through the service and those who come directly to the store. SpeciÞcally the model consists of a referral infomediary and a market with two downstream retailers who compete in price. The retail market is comprised of three consumer segments: a segment loyal to each retailer and a comparison shopping segment that shops on the basis of the lowest price.
The referral infomediary reaches some proportion of the total consumer population and this characterizes the reach of the Internet in this market.
The impact of the infomediary on the market is best illustrated by the case in which one of the retailers is enrolled in the institution. We show that the referral price will always be lower than the retail store price offered by an enrolled retailer. The incentives of the retailer while setting the on-line referral price are driven not only by the comparison shoppers who search at both stores, but also the consumers who would have searched only at the competing store. Thus the use of a referral infomediary as a price discrimination mechanism leads to lower online prices.
Next, the proÞts of the enrolled dealer Þrst increase and then decrease with the reach of the institution.
One might Þnd this surprising because the referral infomediary provides the enrolled retailer the beneÞt of price discrimination as well as the beneÞt of additional demand (because the retailer gets the opportunity to quote a price to all online customers, some of whom were not previously accessible). However, the referral infomediary also creates a competitive effect because it helps an enrolled retailer to poach on its competitor's customers who were previously unavailable. The strategic response by the competitor is to
Introduction
The exponential growth of the Internet is an important business development of the last decade. 1 The growth of e-commerce has been accompanied by changes to the traditional ways of doing business in several industries. The emergence and growth of the so-called "infomediaries" such as Autobytel.com and Carpoint.com in the automobile industry, Avviva.com in real estate, Austinlrs.com in legal services, and Healthcareadvocates.com in medicine evidence the impact of these institutions on the functioning of conventional markets.
The performance of these infomediaries and their impact on the traditional retail marketplace has been closely watched in the automobile industry. These infomediaries (or Internet referral services) such as Autobytel.com, Autovantage and Carpoint provide consumers information on invoice prices, speciÞcations, reviews, and the opportunity to get a price quote from a local retailer who is enrolled with the service.
Third-party referral infomediaries are affecting the way consumers shop and buy their cars. A J.D. Powers study in July 1999 reported that retailers collected an average of 37 leads a month from Internet referral infomediaries and closed an average 15% of them. Forrester Research reports that more than two million households used these Internet companies to research car purchases and estimates that 50% of new car buyers will research purchases on-line in the next Þve years. A recent Consumer Reports survey (Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2000) also indicates that consumer experience with these infomediaries has been positive and that 60% of those who used this service to generate a price quote will go back to them in the future. In fact, the National Automobile retailers Association (NADA), after Þghting with these independent Internet services for several years, has Þnally decided to launch its own car-shopping web-site (Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2000) .
The conventional wisdom on these Internet referral infomediaries is that they are valuable to consumers because consumers can now use these services to research car prices and get binding price quotes from retailers. Less clear is the role of these intermediaries for the retailer and for retail competition. Consider the reactions of retailers to the emergence of referral infomediaries. Reactions cited in a recent Wall Street Journal article indicate dealer concerns over intense price competition "...the beginning of a never ending nightmare" (Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1999) . A recent survey by J.D. Power found that 48% of the retailers surveyed perceived Internet referral services to be a threat to the existing system. At the very least, these reports indicate that referral infomediaries are likely to have economic impact on retail markets.
The analysis presented in this paper is aimed at contributing to an understanding of this phenomenon and its effect on retail markets.
Infomediaries: Key Research Issues
In established markets (such as the one for automobiles), referral infomediaries primarily re-allocate existing customers between retailers in a geographical market. Consumers are not likely to purchase more cars just because of the emergence of a referral service. This re-allocation of customers obviously affects retail competition and thereby retailer proÞts. This raises a series of research questions. How will these intermediaries change the functioning of the retail market and the nature of retail competition? What type of contractual arrangements should these intermediaries use in selling their services to retailers? Under what market conditions will a referral infomediary be viable? What are the implications of the growing reach of the Internet for these institutions?
The model that we develop to study these issues captures two economic characteristics that deÞne a referral infomediary. On the consumer side, an infomediary performs the function of "price discovery."
A consumer who uses the service can costlessly get an additional retail price quote before purchase. On the Þrm side, a referral infomediary endows enrolled retailers with a price discrimination mechanism. A retailer that joins a referral infomediary has the ability to price discriminate between consumers who come through the service and those who come directly to the retail store.
We examine how the infomediary affects the market competition between retailers. We also investigate the optimal contractual policy that a referral infomediary should use to sell its service. Conceptually, this is the problem of how a seller should contract for the sale of a price discrimination mechanism. The literature on price discrimination has dealt with how Þrms can price discriminate between different groups of consumers and on the efficiency of different types of discrimination mechanisms. We go beyond the question of "how" a Þrm can price discriminate, to investigate the manner in which a vendor can sell the ability to price discriminate in a competitive market. We investigate whether the referral infomediary should grant market exclusivity to a retailer as opposed to adopting a non-exclusive policy. This question is relevant because there is signiÞcant variation in the policies adopted by different automobile referral services.
Autobytel, the largest and perhaps the most successful Internet referral infomediary offers geographical exclusivity to its retailers. In contrast, Þrms such as AutoWeb and AutoVantage adopted a non-exclusive policy in most areas.
Brief Overview of Model, Intuition and Results
Our model consists of a referral infomediary and a market with two downstream retailers who compete in price. In the absence of the infomediary the market is comprised of three segments: a segment loyal to each retailer and a comparison shopping segment that shops on the basis of the lowest price. The segment of loyal consumers for a retailer can be thought of as having negligible transaction costs of travel and price discovery at that retailer, but having prohibitively high costs at the competing retailer. Therefore, in the absence of the infomediary these consumers only consider their favorite retailer. The comparison shopping segment has negligible transaction costs of considering both retailers before purchase. The referral infomediary is modeled as an independent entity that reaches some proportion of the total consumer population (a function of the reach of the Internet in this market) and it performs the following functions: a) It allows consumers to costlessly get a price quote from the enrolled retailer. b) It allows an enrolled retailer the ability to price discriminate between consumers who come via the referral infomediary and consumers who come directly to the retail store.
The impact of the infomediary on market competition is best illustrated by the case in which only one retailer is enrolled in the institution. The enrolled retailer has the ability to offer a referral price as well as a brick-and-mortar retail price to consumers who come directly to the store. In contrast, the other retailer can only offer a store price. This endogenously changes the behavior of consumers who use the institution.
Consumers who would have shopped at the enrolled retailer in the absence of the infomediary can now choose from the lower of the referral and store price at that retailer. Consumers who would have shopped at the non-enrolled retailer in the absence of the infomediary will now be able to choose from the lower of that retailer's store price and the referral price. The comparison shoppers who originally searched both the stores will now be able to choose from the lowest of the two store prices plus the referral price. The behavior of consumers who do not use the infomediary remains unchanged.
Our analysis provides several useful implications:
• Retail Prices: The referral price (i.e., price quote to the consumer who approaches retailer via Internet) will be lower than the retail store price offered by the enrolled retailer. The incentives of the retailer while setting the on-line referral price is driven not only by the comparison shoppers who search at both stores, but also the consumers who would have searched only at the competing store.
Thus the use of the referral service as a competitive price discrimination mechanism leads to lower online prices.
• Retailer ProÞt: The proÞts of the enrolled retailer are in the form of an inverted U w.r.t. to the reach of the referral infomediary: i.e., proÞts Þrst increases and then decreases with the reach of the institution. The intuition is as follows. The enrolled retailer's proÞt is governed by three effects. The retailer enjoys the beneÞt of a demand effect because it gets the opportunity to quote a price to all the online consumers, some of whom were previously inaccessible to the retailer. The beneÞt from this demand effect increases with the reach of the institution. However, the referral infomediary also creates a competitive effect because it enables the enrolled retailer to poach on the competitor's customers. The strategic response of the competing retailer is to price aggressively in order to protect its customer base. This increases the intensity of price competition and has negative impact on retailer proÞt. Finally, there is a price discrimination effect. The enrolled retailer can price discriminate the users and non-users of the infomediary by offering different referral and store prices, enabling better surplus extraction from the market. This effect has a positive impact on the proÞt of the enrolled retailer. The beneÞt derived from price discrimination reaches its maximum when the sizes of the infomediary users and non-users segments are relatively close. Thus the beneÞt of the price discrimination effect for the enrolled retailer increases and then decreases as the reach of the referral institution increases. Consequently, when the reach of the referral infomediary is small enough, the beneÞt from the increased demand and price discrimination ability for the enrolled retailer dominates the cost of the increased competition created by the infomediary. This results in the retailer's proÞt increasing with the reach of the institution. However, as the reach of the infomediary further increases the price discrimination beneÞt diminishes and retail competition becomes so intense that proÞt of the enrolled retailer declines with increasing reach.
• Infomediary Contracting Strategy: We Þnd that the referral institution will prefer an exclusive strategy (of allowing only one of the retailers to enroll). A non-exclusive strategy implies that consumers who use the web will get referral prices from both retailers. This creates Bertrand-type competition for these consumers. Consequently, once either one of the retailers becomes a member, the other retailer will make greater proÞts staying out even if the institution owner allows access for free. This result is supported by the available anecdotal evidence. Autobytel's has consistently offered geographical exclusivity to its member retailers and industry experts have pointed to this as being one of the reasons why Autobytel has emerged as the largest and most proÞtable referral infomediary.
In contrast, Þrms such as AutoVantage and AutoWeb, that used the non-exclusive approach have been less successful.
• The Impact of Increasing Reach of the Internet: The analysis also provides insight into how the referral institution might evolve in the future. We Þnd that the referral institution can unravel (in the sense that no retailers can gain any net proÞt from joining the institution) when its reach becomes very high. In this case, any retailer that joins the infomediary will be able to poach on a large proportion of the competitor's customers. The resulting price competition is so intense that the joining Þrm will make no net proÞt than if it had not joined. Consequently, a retailer will not join even if the referral infomediary allows access for free and the institution unravels as a result. It is perhaps this issue that is at the heart of the current attempts by referral services such as Autobytel to diversify into additional service areas such as Þnancing and after-market services.
We also extend the model to the case where the referral infomediary can identify consumers of different segments and Þnd that with customer identiÞcation the institution can exist for all values of reach. This implies that referral services can make complementary investments in consumer identiÞcation as the reach of the institution increases. Finally we extend the basic model to accommodate asymmetry in retailer loyalty and also examine the case where the reach of the Internet varies across the comparison shopping and the retailer loyal segments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related research and Section 3 presents the basic model. Section 4 examines the effect of the infomediary on retail competition while Section 5 examines the infomediary's optimal contracting policies. In Section 6, we develop extensions to the basic model. Section 7 concludes with a brief summary and with directions for future research.
Related Research
Our analysis of the referral infomediary as a price discrimination in a competitive market shows that Internet referral prices can be lower than the prices offered to consumers who do not use these services.
Recently Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva Risso (2001) have used transaction data obtained from Autobytel to compare online prices to retailer showroom prices and Þnd that on average customers with an Autobytel referral pay 2% less for their cars. They attribute this result to Autobytel selecting lowcost retailers, the bargaining power of the referral service and to lower costs of serving an online customer.
Other papers have also empirically investigated the impact of the Internet on prices and on market behavior (Brown and Goolsbee 2000, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) and have shown that while the Internet does lead to lower average online prices, it does not lead to fully frictionless market implying zero economic proÞts for Þrms. A paper by Lal and Sarvary (2000) also makes similar arguments for non-search goods. This paper shows another important context for this view: the context of an Internet institution acting to provide a price discrimination and demand re-allocation mechanism. While the referral infomediary might imply lower Internet prices, it does not mean zero proÞts for the competing retailers.
The paper also adds to the emerging research on Internet institutions. For example, Iyer and Pazgal (2001) analyze the impact of Internet comparison shopping agents on retail competition and show why some online retailers might join a shopping agent despite the fact that this institution allows costless search among all member retailers. While the infomediary also helps consumers to reduce search costs, the key feature of the infomediary that is focused on in this paper is the ability of the infomediary to distinguish between online and offline consumers and to allow a retailer to price discriminate between these two groups.
The Model
We Þrst discuss the speciÞcs of the market in a world without Internet referral infomediaries.
Retailers and the Consumer Market
We consider two retailers (i = 1, 2) who compete in prices in the end-consumer market. Retailers are assumed to be identical in terms of selling costs and these costs are set to zero without loss of generality.
This assumption enables us to develop the demand-side implications of the Internet institution on market competition which is the primary focus of this paper.
The market consists of a unit mass of consumers. Consumers buy at most one unit of the product and have identical reservation prices which can be normalized to 1 without any loss of generality. However, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their transaction costs of shopping at a retailer. These costs include the cost of price discovery as well as any travel costs that are incurred for buying the product at a retailer. A proportion a of consumers have zero transaction cost of considering both retailers before making the buying decision. These consumers are akin to the informed consumers or switchers in the standard models of sales such as Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988) . We will call these consumers "comparison shoppers" in the paper.
Of the remaining 1 − a consumers, a segment of them with a size of b 1 incur zero transaction cost of considering retailer-1 (R1), but a prohibitively high cost of considering retailer-2 (R2). Consequently, they only shop at R1 in the absence of an Internet referral infomediary. In the rest of the paper we will label this segment of consumers as R1-shoppers. The remaining segment of size b 2 are R2-shoppers. They have zero cost of considering R2, but have a prohibitively high cost for R1. These consumers only shop at R2 in the world without the referral infomediaries. In the basic model we assume that
Later we allow b 1 to be different from b 2 in Section 6.
The Impact of a Referral Infomediary
Suppose that a referral infomediary now emerges. A recent J. D. Powers study (April 2000) reveals that nearly 5% of all new car buyers now use an online referral infomediary. Clearly, this number will change over time as the reach and familiarity of the infomediary evolves. To model this we assume that a fraction, k (where 0 < k < 1), of all consumers use the referral infomediary. k is the reach of the referral institution.
We assume for now that this reach is identical across all consumer segments, but will relax this assumption in Section 6.
The infomediary can enroll either one retailer or both. Apart from offering a price to consumers who directly visit the store, an enrolled retailer has the ability to offer the k online consumers a referral price.
The impact of the referral institution on consumer behavior is captured as the follows: Consumers who use the referral infomediary will get an additional and binding price quote from an enrolled retailer at zero cost (consumers can get two price quotes if both retailers are enrolled). 2 In other words, the referral infomediary eliminates the cost associated with price discovery (and thereby reduces the transaction cost of considering a retailer). A consumer with price information obtained through both the referral infomediary and store visit(s) will choose the lowest price and purchase at the retailer who offers that price (either through the online infomediary or at the store). An enrolled retailer can potentially offer different prices to consumers who visit the store directly or inquire prices online. In this manner the infomediary allows a member retailer to price discriminate among its customers. 3 2 One might argue that retailers can set up web-sites that can also offer price quotes. However, a retailer web-site cannot substitute for independent third-party intermediation. There are a number of aspects of the purchasing process that cannot be easily veriÞed and credibly agreed upon on the quote via a retailer web-site. A retailer can offer a low price quote, but such a quote might not be completely enforceable. For example, there might be problems of non-availability of the exact make/model that the customer needs or ambiguity about Þnancing incentives. The retailer can opportunistically use these aspects once the consumer comes to the showroom. The existence of an independent third-party infomediary mitigates these problems and allows the offer of credible on-line prices to consumers. We thank the AE for helpful comments on this issue.
3 Note that on-ßoor negotiations can also help a retailer to discriminate between consumers. However, such
The Game
The objective of the paper is to study how retail competition will respond to the emergence of a referral infomediary and also to analyze how the infomediary should organize its contractual relationship with retailers. We therefore analyze a two-stage game. In the Þrst stage the referral infomediary chooses a contract that has two speciÞc dimensions. The Þrst is a decision on whether to sell the service exclusively to only one retailer in a market (denoted by the subscript x) or non-exclusively to both retailers (denoted by the subscript n). Contingent on this, the referral infomediary also has to choose the payment contract which we denote as C iz (where i denotes the retailer and z = x, n).
Consider Þrst the exclusive contract under which the referral infomediary makes an exclusive offer to one of the two retailers. Figure 1 indicates the timing of the contracting game. If the Þrst retailer rejects the offer the infomediary has the option of offering the service to the second retailer. Thus under the strategy of enrolling only one retailer, say retailer 1, the referral infomediary's contracting strategy consists of an offer of C 1x to retailer 1 and an offer C 2x to the other retailer, retailer 2, in the event that retailer 1 rejects the infomediary's offer. Given this game structure, the infomediary's problem is to choose C 1x and C 2x to maximize its proÞt. Analytically there is no difference between whether the referral infomediary sets both C 1x and C 2x prior to the Þrst retailer's decision or sets C 1x Þrst but sets C 2x only if the Þrst retailer rejects the offer. 4 Note also that in our analysis, the exclusive contract will be self-enforcing in equilibrium: Once a retailer accepts the infomediary's offer, the competing retailer will have no incentive to enroll even if the infomediary offers access for free. If a non-exclusive contract is used, the infomediary simultaneously makes offers to both retailers and the retailers simultaneously decide whether or not to accept the contract.
A retailer will join the institution only if its net gain from joining is positive. In cases where a retailer is indifferent between enrolling the referral service and staying out, we assume that it will choose not to enroll.
Contingent on the contract, the game involves price competition between retailers in which both retailers simultaneously choose prices. If a retailer is enrolled in the referral institution it can choose an online referral as well as a store price. A retailer that is not enrolled chooses only a store price. We will analyze the basic model in the next section to examine the effect of the referral infomediary on retail competition. discrimination is only relevant for consumers who enter the store. In contrast, the infomediary can enable the enrolled retailer to reach a segment that it could not otherwise access: i.e., it can allow the retailer to offer a price quote to consumers who would otherwise have shopped only at the competing retailer. Thus while choosing the online price, the enrolled retailer also has the incentive to "poach" on the other retailer's loyal consumers. Furthermore, it should be noted that the main results of this paper will hold even if there already exists price discrimination (in the shop ßoor) prior to emergence of the infomediary. 4 The part of the game tree that follows the action by R1 to reject C 1x is off the equilibrium path and therefore C 2x represents the off-equilibrium threat which supports C 1x .
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Referral Infomediary and Retail Competition
In this section, we analyze the price competition between retailers and the effect of the Internet referral infomediary on this competition. To begin with we brießy state the results pertaining to the case of retail competition in a market without the referral infomediary. This will provide the baseline against which the impact of the institution can be compared. Without the referral infomediary the model collapses to a standard model of price competition as in Varian (1980) or Narasimhan (1988) with a segment of a consumers who search both retailers and buy at the lower price and two segments of b consumers that visit only one retailer. In equilibrium both retailers adopt mixed strategy pricing. Let H 1 (p) = P r(p 1 ≥ p) and 
Only One Retailer is Enrolled
Suppose that R1 is the enrolled retailer. R1 can therefore set two prices -a store price p 1 for the consumers who come directly to the store, and a price, p 1e , for the consumers who come through the referral infomediary. In this manner, the referral infomediary allows R1 to price discriminate between the consumers who use the referral infomediary and those who do not use it. However, the other retailer, R2, who is not enrolled in the infomediary can set only one price, p 2 , for consumers who come to its store. 5
Let us now examine how the referral infomediary changes consumer behavior. Among the group of k consumers who are reached by the referral institution, we have: A segment of ak comparison shoppers who will consider both retailers and will also get an online referral price. This segment will make its choice based upon the lowest price of p 1 , p 2 and p 1e . A segment of kb R1-shoppers make purchase decisions based upon the prices p 1 and p 1e . There is also another segment of kb consumers who were R2-shoppers in the world without the infomediary and did not consider R1's store. In the presence of the infomediary, these consumers can now receive R1's referral price and make a purchase decision based upon the prices p 2 and p 1e . Finally, the behavior of the group of (1 − k) consumers who do not use the referral infomediary 5 Lal and Villas-Boas (1996) examine a situation where one Þrm competes by choosing two prices against another Þrm choosing single price in a mixed strategy equilibrium. They examine price promotions in a channel with exclusive dealing by one of the manufacturers. In their paper the non-exclusive retailer offers two prices for two manufacturer brands and these prices are relevant only for customers who shop at that retailer. In our analysis the two prices charged by R1 are for the same product, but for different groups of customers (i.e, online and offline consumers). Therefore the two prices allows R1 to price discriminate and also reach some R2's loyal (online) shoppers who were previously inaccessible to R1. will obviously not change from what we speciÞed in Section 3.1. In other words, the group of (1 − k)a comparison shoppers will still consider both the retailers and buy at the lower price of the two prices p 1 and p 2 , while the group of (1 − k)b R1-shoppers (R2-shoppers) will visit R1 (R2) and buy at p 1 (p 2 ).
To proceed with the analysis note that there exists no pure strategy equilibrium in this game. The reasoning for this is as follows: a) Suppose that one retailer, say R2, chooses a price p 2 that is not too low, then R1 would like to just undercut p 2 in order to attract the comparison shoppers; b) Otherwise, R1 will set prices equal to the reservation price in order to maximize the proÞt from its customers who do not comparison shop. A similar reasoning applies to R2's reactions to R1's choices of p 1 and p 1e .
Denote H 11 (p) = P r(p 1 ≥ p), H 1e (p) = P r(p 1e ≥ p), and H 2 (p) = P r(p 2 ≥ p). The proÞt function of R1 when it charges p 1 and p 1e can be written as
The Þrst term in the right-hand side of (1) is R1's proÞt from the R1-shoppers without an online referral.
The second term is R1's proÞt from the comparison shoppers who do not use the referral infomediary. The third term is R1's proÞt from the R1-shoppers who also use the referral infomediary. The fourth term is R1's proÞt from the R2-shoppers who now also use the referral infomediary. The Þnal term is R1's proÞt from the comparison shoppers who use the referral infomediary and search at both R1 and R2's stores as well.
In Appendix A we provide the full analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium. The solution methodology for this game is non standard because of the fact that one of the Þrms is price discriminating and because of the effect that the infomediary has on consumer behavior. The equilibrium price support is described in the following proposition. Proofs of all the propositions are in Appendix A.
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, the support for the prices charged by R1 is continuous with p 1 ∈ (p m , 1] and p 1e ∈ (p b , p m ) where,
The price support for R2 is also continuous with p 2 ∈ (p b , 1).
This proposition establishes the Þrst result of the paper, namely, the relationship between the online referral price and the store price offered by the retailer enrolled in the infomediary. This issue has both theoretical and institutional relevance. It is related to the manner in which a Þrm should use a price discrimination mechanism in the face of competition. As shown in Proposition 1, the referral price offered by the retailer will be lower than the store price. Therefore, the emergence of the infomediary, and its role as a mechanism that offers consumers an additional price quote, leads to unambiguously lower online referral prices.
To understand why the online market is more price elastic for R1, consider the relative proportion of R1-shoppers to the comparison shoppers that R1 faces among the referral service users as opposed to nonusers. A lower value of this relative proportion implies higher price elasticity in the segment. Denoting the relative proportions as γ I and γ s for the infomediary users and non-users segments that R1 faces respectively, we have that
The above inequality obtains because R1 has the incentive to use the referral price to also compete for the kb R2-shoppers who were previously inaccessible (in addition to competing for the comparison shoppers).
Therefore, R1 offers lower online price than store price. Thus, the price discrimination mechanism enabled by the infomediary and the incentive of R1 to compete for the consumers who were otherwise captive to R2 leads to lower online prices than its store prices.
This result helps to clarify the available empirical evidence regarding the impact of referral infomediaries on retail price competition. In a study using transaction data from Autobytel, Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva Risso (2000) compare online transaction prices to regular showroom prices. The authors Þnd evidence that consumers who came to Autobytel retailers with an online referral paid on an average 2% less than those who go directly to the retailer without a referral. Conditional on the retailer and the car chosen, consumers with a referral paid on average $379 less than an offline consumer. The data that we acquired from a Carpoint affiliated Volkswagen retailer in St. Louis, MO also shows that the online referral prices offered are lower than the retailer showroom prices. 6 Proposition 1 provides a basis for why referral infomediaries have been perceived as beneÞcial for consumers and for the growth in their usage.
Given the relationship between p 1 and p 1e shown in Proposition 1, we can now rewrite the proÞt function in (1) as π 1 = π 11 + π 1e where,
The Þrst component π 11 is R1's expected proÞt from the segment of consumers who do not get a referral price and who therefore buy at the store price p 1 . The second component π 1e is R1's proÞt from the segment of consumers who use the infomediary and get a referral price quote p 1e from R1.
The relationship between p 1 and p 1e established in Proposition 1 also allows us to specify R2's proÞt as follows:
The Þrst term in the right side of (5) Recall that this analysis pertains to the sub-game where only one retailer is enrolled by the institution.
The consequence of this exclusivity is that R1 can poach R2's consumers via a suitable choice of p 1e while simultaneously limiting its subsidy to shoppers at its store through choosing an appropriate store price p 1
(which, as shown in Proposition 1, is always greater than p 1e ). In contrast, R2 has to rely on a single price p 2 . The equilibrium results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: In the case where retailer 1 enrolls in the referral infomediary but retailer 2 does not, both retailers adopt mixed strategies in equilibrium. In equilibrium, we have that,
Proposition 2 indicates that the impact of the infomediary on retail competition depends upon its reach. We begin the discussion with the case when the reach is small.
Reach of the Infomediary is Small
The Þrst point to note is that the proÞt of the enrolled retailer Þrst increases and then decreases with the reach of the infomediary. Increasing reach has three effects that govern R1's proÞt. First, an increase in the reach of the infomediary creates a positive demand effect for R1: Among the consumers who use the referral infomediary, R1 can now potentially get additional demand from the segment of consumers who would have previously shopped only at R2. Furthermore, the infomediary allows R1 to offer an additional lower price to attract the comparison shoppers online. However, an increase in k also creates a competitive effect. Because R1 can now use a low referral price p 1e to poach on the previously guaranteed consumers of R2, the strategic response of R2 is to price aggressively and charge a lower p 2 in equilibrium in order to protect its customer base (i.e., R2-shoppers). 8 This leads to more intense price competition imposing a negative effect on both retailers' equilibrium proÞts. Finally, there is a price discrimination effect. The enrolled retailer can price discriminate the users and non-users of the referral infomediary by offering an online referral price different from its store price. This price discrimination ability has a positive effect on the proÞt of the enrolled retailer. The magnitude of this effect reaches its maximum when the sizes of the infomediary user and non-user segments are relatively close, and declines thereafter with further increases in the reach. 9 As a result, when the reach is small enough, the beneÞt from the increased demand and the price discrimination effect for the enrolled retailer dominates the cost of the increased competition created by the referral institution. This results in the enrolled retailer's proÞt increasing with the reach of the institution. However, as the reach further increases the beneÞt from the price discrimination effect diminishes and retail competition becomes so intense that proÞt of the enrolled retailer declines with increasing reach. An alternate way to understand this result is to notice that R1's proÞt from consumers who do not use the infomediary, π 11 (i.e., the proÞt associated with the store price p 1 ), decreases with the reach of the institution, whereas its proÞt from consumers who use the infomediary, π 1e (which is associated with the referral price p 1e ), increases with the reach. Consequently, R1's total equilibrium proÞt has an inverse U relationship with k.
Note also that the proÞt of the enrolled retailer, R1, is always greater than the proÞt of its competitor.
The fact that R1 has exclusive access to consumers using the referral infomediary ensures that it always has higher or equal proÞt than in a world without the infomediary. In contrast, R2 will be hurt by the referral infomediary and its proÞt will be strictly lower than in a world without the institution. Not only does R2 get lower demand, but it is also forced to charge a lower price on average to prevent its consumers who get a referral price from being poached. As we will demonstrate in section 5, this re-allocation of proÞts between the retailers is a determinant of the proÞt that the infomediary can make.
Reach is Large
What happens when the reach of the referral institution becomes sufficiently large with k > 1 − b. Now R2 will price even more aggressively to defend its consumers. Consequently, market competition becomes so intense that there is no net proÞt advantage for R1 to enroll in the infomediary (note that π 1 in this case is the same as that of the case neither retailer joins the institution). This leads to the interesting Þnding that a retailer will have no incentive to join the referral institution even if the infomediary allows enrollment at no cost.
It is useful to understand the feature of the infomediary captured in our model that leads to the above Þnding. What the referral institution allows is the ability for an enrolled retailer to offer a price quote even to customers who would otherwise have not shopped at their store. SpeciÞcally, a referral infomediary allows an enrolled retailer to offer a price quote to consumers who would otherwise have shopped only at the competing retailer. Thus the infomediary allows the enrolled retailer to "poach" on the other retailer's loyal consumers through the referral price. Price discrimination that involves poaching on the other retailer's loyal consumers is a key feature of the infomediary that is highlighted in this paper. And it is this feature that leads to the result that increased reach of the Internet leads to the unraveling of the infomediary in the sense that a retailer will not have the incentive to join even if entry is free.
The Impact of the Referral Infomediary on Retail Prices
The availability of the referral infomediary also has some interesting implications for the prices offered by the competing retailers. As discussed before, the retailer enrolled in the referral infomediary offers higher store price than its Internet referral price. Furthermore, from Proposition 2, we can also verify that the mean store price charged by R1's, E(p 1 ), is higher than R2's mean store price, E(p 2 ). However, R1's mean Internet price, E(p 1e ), is lower than E(p 2 ). This is because the referral infomediary provides the enrolled retailer a price discrimination device, through which R1 can compete aggressively via Internet while limiting its subsidy to its captive consumers who do not utilize the infomediary. In contrast, the non-enrolled retailer has to use a single store price to compete with both the store price and the Internet referral price from its rival. Thus, the average price charged by R2 lies in between R1's average Internet referral price and average store price.
Next consider the impact of k on prices. We Þnd that the difference between the average store price and the average Internet price of the enrolled retailer, E(p 1 ) − E(p 1e ), increases with k. This clearly highlights the price discrimination function of the referral infomediary. Note that E(p 1 ) increases with k, because p 1 is used by the retailer to exploit the R1-shoppers who are not using the referral infomediary. As the reach increases, the retailer will increasingly focus on those consumers with increased store prices. As expected, E(p 1 ) also increases with b, the size of R1's captive consumers. In contrast, E(p 2 ), decreases with k. As the reach of the infomediary increases, the non-enrolled retailer has to price more aggressively to protect its own customer base.
The relationship between the expected Internet referral price, E(p 1e ), and k is also interesting. It increases with k when both k and b are sufficiently small but decreases otherwise. Recall that the nonenrolled Þrm, R2, competes for (1 − k)a consumers with R1's store price, p 1 ; but it competes for (ka + kb) online consumers with R1's referral price, p 1e . As k increases, the difference between p 1 and p 1e increases due to the price discrimination effect. When b and k are sufficiently small, the (1 − k)a segment is large.
Consequently, R2's pricing strategy will focus on attempts to undercut R1's store price p 1 in order to win the (1 − k)a consumers. This implies that the competition in the online market will be less, which leads to higher levels of p 1e . On the other hand, if k and/or b are large, the segment of (1 − k)a consumers will be less attractive while the segment of (ka + kb) consumers who use the referral infomediary become more important to R2. Therefore R2 will set p 2 aggressively to compete with the online price p 1e . As a result, p 1e decreases with k when k and/or b are large.
The empirically observed prices from car retailers are usually the prices for realized transactions. The distributions of the empirically observed prices can be different from the "offered" prices of retailers that we just discussed above. For example, if a consumer in the (1 − k)a segment who faced prices p 1 and p 2 but purchased from R1 because p 1 < p 2 , then most likely in an empirical data-set only the "realized" price p 1 would be recorded but not p 2 . To accommodate this fact, we derive the distributions of the realized (observed) prices from the distributions of offered prices in order to compare our results with the empirical evidence. We Þnd that the results reported above do not change qualitatively if the offered prices are replaced by the realized prices.
Besides looking at the retailers' expected prices, we have also examined the dispersion of retailers' equilibrium prices. Some useful Þndings are:
• The range of p 1 decreases with k but the ranges of p 1e and p 2 increase with k.
• The variance of the realized (observed) price p 1 is higher than that of the realized price p 1e when k is small.
• When k is sufficiently small, the observed variances of both the enrolled store's prices (p 1 and p 1e combined) and the non-enrolled store's prices are lower than the corresponding observed price variances in a world without the infomediary.
When k increases, R1 increases p 1 in order to achieve better price discrimination. Because the upper bound of the distribution for p 1 remains the same (which is the reservation price), this implies that the range of p 1 will decrease with the reach of the institution. Moreover, because the size of the ka + kb segment increases with the reach, the lower bound of p 1e and p 2 will be lower with higher k due to the increased competition for this segment of consumers.
The results above suggest that we should expect to observe lower price dispersion for Internet prices than for store prices and lower price dispersions in the market after the infomediary is introduced as long as the reach of the institution is small enough (note that the current reach is about 5% based on a recent J. D. Powers study (April 2000) ). These implications seem to be consistent with some recent empirical Þndings (see Scott Morton et al. 2001) . The intuition behind these results are similar to those for the relationship between E(p 1e ) and k. When k is small, R2 focuses on competing with p 1 for the (1 − k)a segment so that its distribution will be concentrated in the range of p 1 's distribution. Because the range of p 1 decreases with k, p 2 will be less dispersed as k increases in this case. This in turn leads to a decrease in R1's overall price dispersion. 10 Also because p 2 competes more with p 1 than p 1e under this situation, p 1e 's distribution will be concentrated near its upper bound. The variance of p 1e is therefore lower than that of p 1 under this situation (when k is small).
Both Retailers are Enrolled
Consider now the sub-game in which both retailers are enrolled in the referral infomediary. This implies that both the retailers will have the ability to offer two prices: a store price p i and a referral price p ie , (i = 1, 2). Within the comparison shopping segment, ak consumers will use the infomediary and receive referral prices from both retailers. Their purchase decisions will be based on min(p 1 , p 2 , p 1e , p 2e ). In the remaining market, a total of 2bk consumers will receive referral prices, p 1e and p 2e , and also the store prices from respective stores that they search. A set of bk consumers will choose min(p 1 , p 1e , p 2e ), while the remaining bk of them will choose min(p 2 , p 1e , p 2e ). Finally, the behavior of the set of (1 − k) consumers who do not use the referral infomediary will remain unchanged from that speciÞed in Section 3.1. We have the following proposition regarding the equilibrium in this scenario. Consumers who use the referral institution can get price quotes (p 1e and p 2e ) from both the retailers and can choose to buy at the lower of the two prices. This leads to a homogenous Bertrand price competition in the market comprising of k consumers who use the referral infomediary. Thus, the equilibrium referral prices of both retailers are zero (the marginal cost of the product) and they make zero proÞt from the set of k consumers. Therefore, the competition between the two retailers will be as if they perceive a smaller market comprising only (1 − k) consumers who go directly to the stores. Consequently, the equilibrium proÞt of each retailer goes down to b(1−k) , which is lower than in a world without the referral infomediary.
The characteristic of the referral infomediary captured in the model is that of a mechanism which allows consumers to be reached with an additional price quote. The referral institution in our model does not create additional demand but rather reallocates existing demand among the retailers. This seems to be an accurate way of representing the effect of the institution on retailers. In other words, we believe that consumers do not buy more cars (or increase their valuations for cars) just because Autobytel has come into existence. Rather they use services such as Autobytel and Carpoint to get price quotes in addition to search in the brick-and-mortar world. Thus an infomediary that enrolls both retailers will lead to Bertrand competition in the Internet sector and thereby reduce their proÞts without conferring any compensating beneÞt. In other words, the equilibrium proÞt of each retailer will be lower than that in a world without the infomediary.
Optimal Selling Contracts for the Referral Infomediary
We have analyzed all the possible second-stage sub-games and are now in a position to go back to the Þrst stage to examine the optimal contract and the resulting proÞts for the referral institution. In doing so, we will be able to establish the set of market conditions that supports the endogenous existence of the infomediary. The following proposition establishes the optimal contractual policy for the referral infomediary.
Proposition 4: Let the referral infomediary charge enrolled retailers a lump-sum payment, then:
1. When k < 1 − b, the optimal contracting policy for the referral infomediary is to adopt the exclusive strategy of enrolling only one retailer. The equilibrium contracting strategy is as follows: The referral infomediary offers to charge
to retailer i and an off-equilibrium offer
− 1] to the other retailer in the event that retailer i rejects C ix . In equilibrium, retailer i accepts the offer and the proÞt of the referral infomediary is
2. When k ≥ 1 − b, neither retailer will enroll for any positive payment demanded by the referral infomediary. The referral infomediary unravels and makes zero proÞt.
The non-exclusive strategy of enrolling both retailers can never be optimal for the referral infomediary.
As discussed in the previous section, the infomediary creates Bertrand competition between the enrolled retailers for the group of k consumers who use the service if both retailers are enrolled. The reduction in retailers' proÞt limits the payment that the infomediary can charge. Adopting the exclusive strategy always dominates as it allows the infomediary to charge the enrolled retailer for the beneÞt of exclusive access. Note that the exclusive contract is self-enforcing: Once R1 accepts the infomediary's offer and enrolls, R2 will have no incentive to enroll even if the infomediary offers access for free. 11
From Proposition 4, it is easy to verify that ∂Π ∂k > 0 and ∂Π ∂b > 0. The referral infomediary's proÞts accrue from offering access to a mechanism that provides an enrolled retailer the beneÞts of both demand re-allocation and that of price discrimination. The demand re-allocation effect increases with the reach while the price discrimination effect increases with a larger b. A higher b increases the incentive to price discriminate because it increases the difference between the price elasticities in the segments of users vs.
the non-users of the referral service. In other words, a higher b increases the difference between the ratios γ s and γ I discussed earlier. Therefore, the proÞts of the referral infomediary increase in both k and b.
Perhaps the more interesting point of this proposition is that it identiÞes the condition under which the referral infomediary can exist and make positive proÞts. The referral institution can exist as long as its reach is not too large (i.e., k < 1 − b). When the reach of the infomediary becomes too large, the loss of proÞts from the increased competition that the referral institution creates outweighs the beneÞts from the increased demand and the price discrimination ability that the enrolled retailer will have. As seen in Proposition 2, the proÞt of the enrolled retailer will be the same as that in a world without the infomediary. Consequently, no retailer will have an incentive to join the referral institution. Thus (and somewhat paradoxically) increasing reach can lead to an unraveling of the infomediary. Overall the message that emerges from this analysis is that an institution that acts as a demand re-allocation and a price discrimination mechanism for retailers cannot exist when its reach becomes too large.
It might be surprising that the referral infomediary breaks down at higher values of k even though its proÞt (given that it is viable) actually increases with k. Understanding this helps to reveal some interesting features of the infomediary and the contract that it offers. If the referral institution is viable, its proÞts with the exclusive strategy are
, where π N is the retailer's proÞt in the world without the referral institution. The Þrst component in the expression of C ix , (π 1 − π N ), is the net gain in proÞt for the enrolled retailer compared to the situation where neither retailer joins the referral infomediary. The second component C ix , (π N − π 2 ), is the potential loss in proÞt for the enrolled retailer if it rejects the contract from the infomediary but its competitor enrolls in the infomediary. In addition, the condition of (π 1 − π N ) > 0 must be satisÞed before any retailer is willing to enroll in the referral infomediary. Because π 1 decreases with k when k is large, the referral institution breaks down at high reach levels even though C ix is still increasing in k (because (π N − π 2 ) increases in k).
Variable Fee Contracts
All the analysis up to this point was based upon a lump-sum Þxed fee contract. In this section we examine different types of variable fee contracts that are possible.
Per-Referral Based Variable Fee
Some referral services have charged retailers a per referral-based variable fee (an example is Autoweb.com).
Suppose the referral infomediary charges a per-referral fee of v. The maximum total proÞt that the infomediary can get will still be the difference between the proÞts of the enrolled and the non-enrolled dealer.
It can be shown that (for a given k) the optimal per-referral fee is v * =
. From this it is evident that the optimal fee is decreasing in k. In addition, the infomediary will make the same amount of proÞts as under the lump-sum arrangement.
Next, we analyze the case where the infomediary adopts sales based variable fee by charging a fee m for each unit that the enrolled retailer sells using the infomediary. As in the case of the lump-sum fee arrangement, the referral infomediary will not enroll both retailers. If both retailers are enrolled their on-line prices will be competed down to m. Each retailer's proÞt will be π i = (1 − k)b which is less than the guaranteed proÞts b that they would make if they do not enroll.
This means that the optimal strategy for the infomediary is the exclusive strategy of enrolling only one retailer. We present the full analysis of this contract in Appendix B. As in the case of the lump-sum fee, we have that, in equilibrium, the on-line referral price offered by the enrolled retailer will be lower than its store price. We Þnd that for k < (1 − b)(1 − m), π 1 > b and π 1 > π 2 when m → 0. Therefore, the infomediary is able to enroll one retailer and make positive proÞt. However, similar to the previous analysis with the lump-sum fee, when k ≥ (1 − b)(1 − m) the infomediary unravels in the sense that no retailer will want to enroll for any feasible value of the commission. Thus the result of the paper that the infomediary will unravel for higher values of reach continues to be valid with variable fee contracts.
The infomediary's proÞt maximization problem can be written as:
∂p 1e dp 1e
We compared the equilibrium infomediary proÞts under sales-based commissions to those under the lump-sum fee. The maximum Π * can be obtained numerically for any given k and b by grid searching for optimal m * between (0, 1) and can then be compared to the lump-sum based proÞts. We Þnd that the infomediary's proÞt with the lump-sum fee always dominates the proÞt with sales-based commissions. The intuition for this result is as follows: Recall that the referral infomediary proÞt is comprised of two parts.
The Þrst part depends on the net gain of proÞt, (π 1 − b), enjoyed by the enrolled retailer compared to the case without the infomediary. The second part is dependent on the potential loss in proÞt, (b − π 2 ), for a retailer if it rejects the contract but its competitor enrolls in the infomediary. A sales-based commission m has both a positive and a negative effect on the proÞt gain (π 1 − b). The increase in the marginal cost of the enrolled retailer by m creates double marginalization. The strategic effect of this is to soften competition for the consumers reached online and this has a positive effect on the proÞt gain. The commission also increases the retailer's cost of selling online through infomediary which has a negative effect on (π 1 − b).
However, the impact of m on (b − π 2 ) is always negative because reduced competition for online consumers leads to less potential loss for the non-enrolled retailer. In other words, the threat which the infomediary can impose on a retailer who rejects the contract is always lower with higher commissions. In sum, the infomediary's proÞt with a sales-based commission contract is lower than that with a lump sum fee contract because the threat of not joining the infomediary is lower with the commission contract. This result sheds light on why sales-based commissions are not observed to be used by referral services in the automobile industry.
Extensions
The Impact of Consumer Identification
We assumed in the basic model that the referral infomediary as well as the enrolled retailer(s) cannot distinguish between the comparison shoppers, its own loyals and the other retailer's loyal consumers.
However, over time the referral infomediary would also be able to collect detailed information on consumer preferences. This should allow the institution and an enrolled retailer to develop the ability to identify consumer types and thereby allow the retailer to customize its price quotes accordingly. The enrolled retailer, R1, will be able to offer customized referral prices depending upon the identity of the on-line consumer. 12 Accordingly, let us deÞne the referral price offered by the enrolled retailer to its own loyals (i.e. R1 shoppers) as p ae , the referral price offered to R2's shoppers as p be and Þnally the referral price offered to the comparison shoppers as p ce . The enrolled retailer R1's proÞt function now is
Using the similar reasoning as in the basic model it can be shown that p ae = p 1 and p 1 ≥ p ce in equilibrium. Similarly it can also be shown that p 1 ≥ p be in equilibrium. Therefore, we have that
Again, following the same logic used in deriving the equilibrium of the basic model, we can prove that the lower bound of p 1 equals to the upper bound of both p be and p ce in equilibrium. From (8), we can also see that the optimization problem for R1 with respect to p be and p ce are the same. Thus, p be and p ce have the same distribution in equilibrium, i.e. H be (p) = H ce (p) = H 1e (p). Therefore, R2's proÞt function can be written as
We obtain that in the equilibrium:
Proposition 5: The optimal contracting policy for the infomediary is to adopt the exclusive strategy of enrolling only one retailer. With consumer identiÞcation, the equilibrium contracting strategy is as follows: it charges C ix = b 2 1−(1−k) 2 b+(1−2b)(1−k) 2 to a retailer i and charges −2b) to the other retailer in the event that retailer i rejects the offer. The equilibrium proÞt of the referral infomediary is
Comparing the above results with those in Proposition 4, we can see that the referral infomediary's proÞts are higher with consumer identiÞcation. But the more important point is that with consumer identiÞcation, the institution will not unravel as the reach increases. In fact, it is now possible for the infomediary to exist for all values of k. This provides an interesting insight into the strategies that referral infomediaries should adopt as they evolve. As the reach of the infomediary increases, it would also be important for the institution to make complementary investments in improving customer identiÞcation.
With customer identiÞcation the proÞts of the infomediary will always be increasing in reach regardless of the level of reach attained (i.e., ∂Π ∂k > 0 always).
Heterogeneity in the Reach and in Retailer Loyalty
We now discuss the key implications of relaxing two assumptions in the basic model. In the basic model we assumed that retailers were symmetric in terms of the sizes of their "own" (or loyal) segments of consumers.
But in many markets retailers may differ w.r.t to the size of these segments. We now relax the assumption made in the basic model and let b 1 > b 2 without loss of generality (i.e. let R1 be the retailer with a larger size of the shoppers who only search at its store). We will label R1 as the "large" retailer and R2 as the "small" retailer. Furthermore, in the basic model we had also assumed that the reach of the institution, Consider Þrst the effect of asymmetry in b 1 and b 2 . Our analysis shows that, as long as the reach of the infomediary is symmetric across all segments, it is always optimal for the referral infomediary to exclusively enroll the large retailer in the market. In addition, the infomediary's proÞt increases as the retailers become more asymmetric (i.e. as b 1 /b 2 increases). To understand this, note that the price discrimination ability conferred by the infomediary is more valuable for the retailer that has a larger size of loyal shoppers. In addition, enrolling the large retailer reduces the number of consumers who are likely to be poached (i.e., only b 2 consumers can be poached). This reduces the intensity of market competition and allows the infomediary to charge a higher price. Now consider the case where there is also asymmetry on the reach dimension. We Þnd that the infomediary's proÞt increases with k a , the reach of the institution among the comparison shoppers. With an increase in k a , a greater number of comparison shoppers get two prices from the enrolled retailer R1.
Thus, all else being equal, the non-enrolled retailer will get less demand from the comparison shopping segment (because its store price will now have to be lower than both prices offered by R1). The strategic response of R2 will therefore be to focus more on extracting surplus from the R2-shoppers. This reduces the overall intensity of price competition between the two retailers and allows the infomediary to extract a higher proÞt. Next, we Þnd that the infomediary's proÞt increases with k b , the reach among the segment of consumers who do not comparison shop, if the overall reach (k a + k b ) is small; and its proÞt decreases with k b if the overall reach is sufficiently large. The intuition for this result is similar to that for the relationship between π 1 and k discussed in Section 4.1.1.
Finally, with asymmetry in reach it can be optimal for the infomediary to enroll the small but not the large retailer. It turns out that the referral infomediary will Þnd it optimal to exclusively enroll the small retailer if: (a) the reach of the institution among the comparison shoppers (i.e., k a ) is sufficiently large compared to that among the loyals (k b ); and (b) b 1 is sufficiently large as compared to b 2 .
Incorporating Shopping Costs
In this sub-section we consider an extension that generalizes the basic model by incorporating shopping costs that consumers might incur in traveling and price discovery prior to buying. Assume that all consumers have a Þxed endowment of the total time available for 1) traveling to retailers and 2) price discovery, which we normalize to 1 without any loss of generality. Note that the time costs of price discovery may include the time spent in understanding promotional policy, examining the Þne print and Þnancing plans, etc.
In a world without the infomediary there are two segments of consumers of size 1 2 each. Consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the time needed for travel and price discovery at a retailer. In the Þrst segment (denoted as L 1 ), a consumer i incurs time T iN0 for travel and price discovery at R1 and time T iF 0 for travel and price discovery at R2 (the subscripts 'N" and "F" denote "near" and "far"). Assume that time T iN0 varies across the consumers in L 1 , but for all consumers T iN0 < T iF 0 and T iN0 < 1. Therefore consumers in this segment always search and consider R1. However, T iF 0 varies across consumers in L 1 such that T N0 + T F 0 < 1 for only a proportion of θ 0 consumers in this segment. Therefore, a proportion of θ 0 consumers in L 1 considers both retailers and buys from the retailer charging the lower price. The remaining 1 − θ 0 proportion consumers in L 1 only consider R1. 13 Similarly, we assume that a proportion of θ 0 consumers in the second segment (L 2 ) considers both retailers and buys from the retailer charging the lower price and the rest 1 − θ 0 proportion consumers in this segment only consider R2.
Consider the impact of the infomediary and let R1 be the enrolled retailer. Consumers in L 2 who are reached by the infomediary (k proportion) will now be able to get a price quote from R1 at a negligible cost. Consequently, the time required by these L 2 consumers to consider R1 will now be T iF , which is lower than T iF 0 . This is because referral infomediary saves the price discovery related time for L 2 consumers (and T iF can therefore be thought of as the sunk cost of travel which these consumers will still have to incur).
DeÞne θ to be the proportion of these consumers in L 2 with T iN0 + T iF < 1. We have θ > θ 0 because T iF is less than T iF 0 . As a result, a proportion k (θ − θ 0 ) of L 2 consumers will compare R1's online price with R2's price and buy at the lower price. A proportion kθ 0 of L 2 consumers will compare R1's online price and offline price with R2's price and buy at the lowest price. Similarly, L 1 consumers who are reached by the infomediary will always compare R1's online price with its offline price and buy at the lower price and a proportion θ 0 of these L 1 consumers will compare R1's online price and offline price with R2's price and buy from the lowest price. Obviously, the behavior of the off-line consumers in both segments who are not reached by the infomediary (1 − k proportion) remain unchanged.
The proÞt functions of the retailers are:
We can see that if g = k ( i.e., θ = 1) retailers' proÞt functions are identical to that in the basic model. The parameter g can be interpreted as the extent of demand-reallocation created by the infomediary from R2 to R1. It is the proportion of consumers who previously considered R2 alone but who also start considering the enrolled retailer R1 because of the infomediary. The cutoff k beyond which the infomediary unravels decreases as g increases because of greater demand re-allocation. Greater the demand reallocation, the more aggressively will R2 price in order to protect its loyal consumers, leading to more intense price competition. Consequently, the infomediary unravels for lower values of k. We also have that the infomediary's proÞts are increasing in g and 
Conclusion and Future Research
Recently, we have seen the emergence of Internet intermediaries that have impacted on the strategies of Þrms in traditional markets in many industries. Examples include Autobytel in the automobile market, Healthcareadvocates.com in healthcare and Avviva.com in the real-estate business. The rationale for these intermediaries and their implications for competition between Þrms in traditional markets is the focus of this paper.
Our interest in this phenomenon is motivated by what appears to be important economic properties of these infomediaries. On the demand side, the referral infomediary helps consumers to costlessly get an additional retail price quote before purchase. On the Þrm side, a referral infomediary endows enrolled retailers with a price discrimination mechanism. A retailer that joins an infomediary has the ability to price discriminate between online consumers and those who come directly to the retail store. These properties raise some interesting research questions. For instance, how does the infomediary affect the incentives of an individual retailer to enroll in their service? What are the implications of the infomediary for the competition between retailers in a market? What is the optimal contractual policy that a referral infomediary should use to sell its service? This last question pertains to the problem of how a seller should contract for the sale of a price discrimination mechanism.
We Þnd that the referral price will always be lower than the retail store price offered by the enrolled retailer. This result illustrates the role of the referral infomediary as a competitive price discrimination mechanism and hence the rationale for lower online prices. More importantly, we Þnd that the proÞts of the enrolled retailer are in the form of an inverted U with respect to the reach of the referral infomediary:
i.e., proÞts Þrst increase and then decrease with the reach of the institution. This result seems somewhat counter-intuitive. One would expect that the ability to price discriminate and to get additional demand must result in higher proÞts. However, the referral infomediary also helps a retailer to poach on its competitors customers who were previously unavailable. The strategic response by the competitor is to price aggressively in order to protect its loyal base and this intensiÞes price competition leading to lower equilibrium proÞts. This competitive effect increases with the reach of the institution.
Our analysis of the contracting problem of the infomediary shows that the referral institution prefers an exclusive strategy (of allowing only one of the retailers to enroll) to a non-exclusive strategy. A nonexclusive strategy implies that consumers who use the web will get referral prices from both retailers. This creates Bertrand-type competition for these consumers. Consequently, both retailers make less proÞt than in the world without the infomediary and will stay out even if the institution owner allows access for free.
Perhaps the most interesting result is that the referral institution can unravel (in the sense that neither retailer can gain any net proÞt from joining the institution) when its reach becomes very high. In this case, any retailer that joins the institution will be able to poach on a large proportion of the competitor's customers. The resulting price competition is so intense that a retailer makes no net gain in proÞt from joining. It is perhaps this problem that is at the heart of the current attempts by referral services such as Autobytel to diversify into additional service areas such as Þnancing and after-market services.
The phenomenon of infomediaries is new and this paper is an attempt at understanding the institution and its implications. There are several interesting areas for future research in this area. We do not explicitly model the role of the infomediary in allowing consumers to bargain with retailers. Consideration of this issue will help us better understand the broader economic question of how competition will be affected in markets moving from bargaining to posted prices. We study the implications of infomediaries for retailers and consumers. It would be useful to explore the implications of infomediaries for players further upstream in the channel (i.e., manufacturers). Do infomediaries represent an alternative means for manufacturer's to structure downstream behavior? Finally, it would be interesting to examine competition between infomediaries and the manner in which they would enroll retailers. From the above, we have that in the equilibrium 1) the joint price support of p 1 and p1e is continuous; 2) p1 ≥ p1e; and 3) there is no more than one common point in the joint price support of p1 and p1e. Therefore, there exists a pm so that p1 is distributed from p m to 1 and p 1e is distributed from p b to p m . We have also shown before that the price support is from p b to 1 for p2. This completes the proof of Proposition 1. The exact expressions for pm and p b are reported in the Proposition and are derived as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1, we have that for R1: π1 = π11 + π1e (6) π11 = (1 − k)bp1 + (1 − k)aH2(p1)p1 (pm ≤ p1 ≤ 1) π1e = kbp1e + kbH2(p1e)p1e + kaH2(p1e)p1e (p b ≤ p1e < pm).
Consider R2's proÞt, π2. We have that π2 = (1 − k)bp2 + (1 − k)aH11(p2)p2 + kbH1e(p2)p2 + kaH1e(p2)p2.
From the three invariance conditions that must be satisÞed in a mixed strategy equilibrium, we have that dπ 11 dp 1 = 0, dπ 1e dp 1e = 0, dπ 2 dp 2 = 0.
Denote H11(1) = q1, H2(1) = q2, and H1e(pm) = q1e. From the proof of Proposition 1, we have that The equations in (8) deÞne a set of ordinary differential equations (ODE) with the boundary conditions provided in (9). This system of ordinary differential equations can be solved using the standard techniques for solving ODEs (see for e.g., Rainville and Bediant 1974), which gives the equilibrium price distribution functions H1(p), H1e(p), and H2(p). Then the equilibrium solutions for π1, π11, π1e, π2, q1, q1e, q2, E(p1), E(p1e) and E(p 2 ) can be obtained from (6), (7), (9) and their deÞnitions. The results along with the solutions for p b and pm are reported in Proposition 1 and 2 in the paper. The cutoff condition k < 1 − b corresponds to the condition for q1 < 1 (i.e., pm < 1).
In this subgame, Þrms are in Bertrand competition for the ka + 2kb consumers who use the infomediary. Therefore, pie = 0. For the remaining market, a size of (1 − k)b consumers each will buy from R1 (R2) and pay p1(p2), a size of (1 − k)a of consumers will buy from the dealer with lower store price. Thus, the competition in this case between the two Þrms using p1 and p2 is as if there was no infomediary but with the market size scaled down by 1 − k. Therefore πi = (1 − k)b and Hi(p) = b a ( 1 p − 1) in the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
As discussed in the paper, if neither dealer enrolls, πN = b. Consider the case in which one retailer (say R1) enrolls in the informediary. Denote the equilibrium proÞt of the enrolled retailer as πA and the proÞt of the non-enrolled retailer as πD. Finally, denote the equilibrium proÞts of the of the retailers when both are enrolled as πB. We have from Proposition 2, if only one dealer enrolls (say R1), π A = b(1 − k) Consider the contract in which the infomediary offers C1x to R1, and makes the (off-equilibrium) threat to offer C 2x to R2 in the event R1 rejects C 1x . Referring to Figure 1 , R1 will accept C1x if πA − C1x ≥ πD, if it is the case that rejection of C1x by R1 results in R2 accepting C2x. Note that (in the event of rejection of C1x by R1) R2 will accept C2x if πA − C2x ≥ πN . Thus the optimal contract involves the infomediary charging R1 C 1x = π A − π D and threatening to sell to R2 (in the event of rejection by R1) at a price C2x = πA − πN . However, this threat is only credible if C2x > 0, which is true when k < (1 − b). Therefore for k < (1 − b), we have that the optimal C1x = −1]. Furthermore, in this range note that πB < πD, which means that the exclusive contract offer is self-enforcing (i.e. if R1 accepts the offer, then R2 is better off not accepting).
Consider, the case when k ≥ (1 − b), πA = b, πD = b(1 − b), πN = b and πB = b(1 − k). To solve for the contracting equilibrium of this case, consider the event that R1 has rejected some C1x offered by the infomediary. Because, πA = πN , R2 will not enroll in the infomediary for any C2x > 0. Thus if R1 rejects any C1x it can guarantee itself a proÞt of π N . Because π A = b there is no C 1x > 0 that will be accepted by R1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Note that exactly as in the basic model it is not optimal for the infomediary to enroll both retailers. For the case of one retailer being enrolled, given the proÞt functions in (8) and (9) in the paper, the equilibrium solutions can then be derived using the same method of proof as in Propositions 1 and 2 of the basic model. We obtain that in equilibrium the proÞt of the enrolled retailer R1 is π1e = b + to R2 if R1 rejects the offer. It can be veriÞed that this threat is credible.
